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DISCRIMINATION AND ITS
JUSTIFICATION: COPING
WITH EQUALITY RIGHTS
UNDER THE CHARTER*
By

RICHARD MOON**

The article examines and appraises conventional methods of interpreting the section
15 equality rights including a comparision of equality rights under the American
Constitution. It determines that the most suitable interpretation is one which
prohibits "constructive discrimination." Further, the analysis of section 15 finds a
built-in limitation - the right against invidious discrimination - making recourse to
section 1 unnecessary. But review of constructive discrimination and its justification
is constrained by the adjudicative model and the state action doctrine. In the final
analysis, the article challenges us to rethink our classic liberal conceptions of
equality by looking less at invidious states action and more at the equality of result
- yet accepting that the courts are a limited forum.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In the most recent edition of his constitutional law text,
Professor Peter Hogg sets out the steps he believes a judge should
follow when deciding whether a particular law violates section 15 of
the Charter.1
When faced with the claim that a particular piece of
legislation is contrary to the equality provision, a judge must first
look to see if the law makes a distinction on any basis - extending
benefits to, or imposing restrictions on, some but not all individuals.
Hogg believes that the equality provision guarantees the universal
application of laws. If a law differentiates between individuals in
section 15 and,
any way and on any ground, then it violates
2
therefore, prima facie violates the Charter.
1 P. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: CarsweIl, 1985) at 800-801.
2 Ibid.
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According to Hogg, once a violation of section 15 is found,
the judge must look to section 1 of the Charter and decide whether
the limitation on the right to equality is "reasonable" and
"demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society." The
classification used in the legislation must be "rationally" related to a
valid purpose, and the purpose must be important enough to justify
deviation from the principle of universal application. If differential
treatment is necessary for the achievement of the law's goal, then
the judge must balance the significance of the law's goal against the
unfairness of the law's differential treatment.
Most laws draw lines and use classifications, and so, if Hogg's
view of section 15 is accepted, most laws will be found to violate the
section. Whenever a law distinguishes between one group and
another (whether between rich and poor or between margarine
producers and butter producers) for any reason and in any
circumstance, the onus will shift to the party seeking to uphold the
law, usually the state, to show that the distinction drawn is
"reasonable" and "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society."
What standard of justification is this? Must the state show
that the distinction is necessary to further a compelling state
interest; a standard that in the United States has been called "strict
scrutiny?"3 Hogg accepts that strict scrutiny will sometimes be the
appropriate standard of justification under section 1. The state must
show that the law's purpose is necessary and cannot be achieved
without using the particular classification. But at other times, says
Hogg, the burden to be met will be very slight; so long as there is
some reason for the distinction, the standard will be met and the
distinction justified. 4
Why should there be this variation in the standard of
justification? Nothing in section 1 suggests that sometimes, only a
very significant public interest will justify a limitation on a right

As will be discussed below, strict scrutiny is ordinarily regarded as a test for
determining the presence of prejudice in the legislative process. Strict scrutiny involves an
assessment of both the means and ends of a law.
4 Supra, note 1 at 799.
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while at other times, a minor interest will be sufficient.5 It is
apparent that for Hogg not all violations of section 15 are the same.
Some deviations from the principle of universal application are more
serious than others and therefore require greater justification.
Indeed, if sometimes any reason will be sufficient to justify
differential treatment, then it seems that the universal application of
the law is not a right at all. Ordinarily, something more than
"rationality" is required of a limitation on a fundamental human
6
right.
Hogg puts forward the principle of universal application as
a simple and straightforward explanation of the equality provision.
But clearly his explanation is neither of these things. A complex
theory of equality is hidden here. Hogg has shifted the focus of the
debate concerning the meaning and scope of the right to equality
from section 15, to section 1, the provision which allows limits to be
placed on Charterrights. The controversy about the meaning of the
terms "equality" and "discrimination" is concealed behind the general
language of section 1.
Hogg has come to the conclusion that section 15 guarantees
the universal application of laws because he believes that any other
interpretation of the section would leave no role for section 1. His
reasoning is as follows. Section 15 guarantees equality without
discrimination. Discrimination could have one of two meanings. It
could mean differential treatment of any and every kind. Or it
could mean differential treatment which is "invidious" - for example,
differential treatment which cannot be justified because it was made
for an improper or inadequate reason. Hogg observes that if the
latter and pejorative meaning of the term were adopted, then there
would be no need to look to section 1 once a violation of section
15 had been found; for if it were decided that a classification in a
particular law was invidious, then that classification could not
possibly be justified under the terms of section 1 (as "reasonable"
and "demonstrably justified..."). And, since the drafters of the
Chaiter must have intended that section 1 would have a role to play

5See R. v. Oakes (1986), 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200.
6 Ibid.
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in Charteradjudication, Hogg concludes that the proper meaning of
"discrimination" must be its "neutral" meaning, a differential
treatment of any type.
There is, however, no need to accept the premises of Hogg's
argument. The term "discrimination" could be interpreted to mean
something other than invidious differentiation or differentiation of
any and every kind. There is at least one significant intermediate
interpretation of the term available to the courts. Section 15 could
be interpreted as prohibiting "constructive" discrimination.
"Constructive" discrimination occurs when a law has a disproportionate impact on a disadvantaged group and its purpose is not
significant enough to justify this impact. Only when a law has a
disproportionate impact on a disadvantaged group will the 7court
have to consider whether the law is justified under section 1.
In any event, is it necessary that section 1 have a role to
play in decisions concerning the equality provision? Although most
rights in the Charter are not protected absolutely and are subject to
limitation under section 1, the courts have recognized that several
Charter rights have a limitation built into them. When the court
finds that one of these rights, such as the right against unreasonable
search and seizure, has been violated, recourse to section 1 is
unnecessary. 8 Section 15 could be interpreted as having a limit built
into it (a right against invidious discrimination) so that recourse to
section 1 is unnecessary. So long as section 1 has a role to play
when other Charter rights are in issue, the section has a purpose.
The section need not have a role in section 15 adjudication.
It appears that Hogg does not really think that the right to
"equality" requires that all laws have universal application. He
accepts that sometimes differential treatment will clearly be justified,
and other times, it will be more controversial. How could it be
otherwise? No infringement of a basic human right occurs each
time a law makes a distinction. A significant countervailing interest
is not needed to override the "wrong" involved in the use of
legislative classification. Individuals are not all identical in their

7 A more complete discussion of constructive discrimination is provided below.
8 R. v. Noble (1984), 16 C.C.C. (3d) 146 at 170, 14 D.L.R. (4th) 216 at 240.
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abilities and needs and to treat them identically would make very
little sense. The distribution of social resources should reflect the
complexity of society and the diversity of its citizenry. A wide
variety of legislative distinctions seem quite ordinary and acceptable.
Some individuals will be able to use or enjoy certain benefits or
opportunities that others will have no need or use for. Indeed,
given the different circumstances of individuals, certain laws which
are neutral on their face may be unfair and even discriminatory. To
require everyone to work on Saturday but not Sunday would be to
treat all persons identically but perhaps not "equally."
The use of classification in law is not inherently wrong. Yet
we do feel that some classifications are wrong, or, at least, suspect
in that they may be used for improper reasons or may have
unacceptable consequences. It is this intuition that Hogg draws on
when he suggests that it will be appropriate for the courts to use
varying standards of justification under section 1, depending on the
nature of the classification sought to be justified. However, Hogg's
analysis of the interaction of section 15 and section 1 of the Charter
suppresses difficult questions concerning the meanings of equality
and discrimination. In particular, it does not address the issue of
whether the right prohibits only intentional discrimination or
whether it goes further and prohibits laws which have a
disproportionate impact (a detrimental effect) on particular groups
of individuals, regardless of the legislator's intention?
The American Supreme Court has stated that the equal
protection clause prohibits only intentional discrimination and that
the effect of a law on a minority group is relevant only in so far as
it may be evidence of an intention to discriminate. 9 It is not yet
certain whether Canadian courts will follow the American lead and
limit the equality right to a prohibition on intentional discrimination.
However, there is reason to believe that Canadian courts will take
an expansive view of the right and interpret it as a prohibition on
"effects" discrimination.° The equality right is not easily confined to

Washington v. Davis, 96 S.Ct. 2040 (1976) at 2048.
10 See Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association et aL (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513, 26
D.LR. (4th) 728 (Ont. C.A.) [hereinafter Blainey] and Ontario Human Rights Commission
v. Simpsons-SearsLimited, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321.
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a prohibition of intentional discrimination. Intention to discriminate
is difficult to discover.
But, more fundamentally, there are
difficulties with the idea of discrimination as a conscious effort to
disadvantage a particular individual or group. Discrimination seems
to operate at an unconscious or irrational level and involves the use
of cultural assumptions that are not centered in an individual actor.
Generally, the intention to discriminate must be constructed by the
courts from social circumstances.
Review for intentional discrimination involves the courts in an examination of the means and
ends of a law to determine whether the law reflects an intention to
discriminate. The step from examination of effects as a test for
intentional discrimination to examination of effects as the standard
of equality is difficult to avert because of problems surrounding the
concept of intention and because the right to equality is understood
to have implications for the outcome of laws.
However, I will argue that if the Canadian courts do adopt
the view that section 15 of the Charter involves a prohibition of
effects discrimination, they will have a difficult time defining the
scope of the right and enforcing it in a way that does not undermine
their institutional legitimacy.11 Although review for "constructive

11 Similar concerns are raised in a recent article by A. Brudner, "What Are Reasonable
Limits to Equality Rights?" (1986) 64 Can. B. Rev. 469.
Professor Brudner's response to these "difficulties" is very different from mine. He
believes that the courts should apply a "rationality" test to determine whether an act of the
state violates the right to equality. According to Professor Brudner, if the courts were to

apply a rationality test, properly conceived, they could avoid the varying standards of review
followed by the American courts (strict scrutiny) and the intention/effects dichotomy.

I am not convinced that any form of rationality test is a satisfactory answer. Legislative
generalizations are not simply correct or incorrect (rational or irrational). Was the internment
of the Japanese during World War II irrational? The policy was not totally devoid of reason.

Do we not and should we not set a higher standard scrutiny (of means/ends rationality) when
we are determining the validity of an act of this sort? We are more demanding because we

are more suspicious that prejudice has played a role in the decision (stereotypes about
Japanese Canadians and Japanese Americans) or because we are concerned about the

disadvantaged position of the particular group.
Professor Brudner refers to the Feeney case (see footnote 25), in which the American
Supreme Court examined a statute which gave preference to veterans in recruitment for public
service employment. He says that "in this context, the use of such criteria conclusively violates
the systematic principle of careers open to talents, which-principle measures the impartiality
of the social distribution of preferred positions." It is unclear to me why a policy which
involves giving preference to veterans is "irrational" (at 498). If this preference for hiring
veterans did not have a disparate impact on women (because of discrimination in military
service), I do not think it would present any problems.
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discrimination" does not give full effect to equality of result, even
this limited review (of laws which have a disproportionate impact on
a disadvantaged group) involves the courts in a potentially openended task; an assessment of the effect of the system of laws and an
attack on inequality in social status. This partial protection of
equality of result will not fit comfortably within the structures of
constitutional adjudication. The courts may simply have to "muddle
through," striking a difficult balance between the assertion of social
justice and the maintenance of a judicial role which is consistent
with their position in the Canadian constitutional system.
II. HUMAN EQUALITY
Section 15 guarantees to everyone "equality before and under
the law, the equal protection of the law and the equal benefit of the
law without discrimination......12 It is generally assumed that the
inclusion in section 15 of several "equality rights" was a response to
the Supreme Court's narrow interpretation of the equality provision
in the Bill of Rights.13 The conventional view is that the Charter
contains a single right to equality which stands as a limit on all
forms of governmental action. But even if the various clauses of
section 15 are viewed as constituting a single right to equality, they
may also be seen as reflecting the complex structure of that right.
The various formulations of the right to equality set out in section
15 may represent different dimensions of the right.
The
appropriateness of a particular formulation will depend upon the
context in which the right is invoked.
The right to equality rests upon the abstract principle that
human beings are of equal worth. This is not an empirical claim

However, my response to the difficulties involved in interpreting s. 15 is far less satisfying.
As will become apparent, I believe that the courts have no choice but to try and cope with

a variety of tensions.
12 Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

13 W. Tarnopolsky, 'The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. B. Rev. 242 at 249-50; M. Gold, "A Principled Approach to
Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry' (1982) 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 131 at 135.
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that all individuals are the same in their natural endowments of
character and ability. It is rather an ethical claim to the effect that
all individuals, as human beings, are of equal worth, and despite
their differences in ability and character, are equally entitled to
consideration and respect 4 A human being is characterized by the
capacity to reason, to make mural judgments, to set goals and work
towards them, and to care about, and form relationships, with others.
What, then, is involved in treating individuals as worthy of
equal concern and consideration? The abstract principle does not
require the identical treatment of all individuals. The idea that all
individuals ought to be treated identically is expressed in Hogg's
claim that all law ought to have universal application. But this
principle is inadequate as a formulation of the right to equality and,
indeed, as was suggested above, Hogg seems unwilling to embrace
it fully. As R.H. Tawney has said:
[E]quality of provision is not identity of provision. It is to be achieved, not by
treating different needs in the same way, but by devoting equal care to ensuring
that they are met in the different ways most appropriate to them ....
The more
anxiously, indeed, a society endeavours to secure equality of consideration for all
its members, the greater will be the differentiation of treatment which, when once
their common human needs have been met, it accords to the special needs of
15
different groups and individuals among them.

Sometimes the right to equality is expressed in the form of
the precept "like cases ought to be treated alike" (also expressed as:
those similarly situated ought to be similarly treated).1 6 This
principle attempts to accommodate the fact that human beings are
different, that they have different needs, abilities, and goals. There
is no obligation to treat two people who are unalike in a like way
but it would be arbitrary and unfair to treat differently two people
who are alike. Some account must be taken of the subjects of
equality, their particular and different needs and interests.

14 R.H. Tawney, Equaliy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931) at 47.
15 Ibid at 51-52.
16 Re McDonald and the Queen (1985), 21 C.C.C. (3d) 330, 21 D.L.R. (4th) 397. See
also J. Tussman & J. tenBroek, 'The Equal Protection of the Laws" (1949) 37 Cal. L. Rev.
341.
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The principle that we ought to treat like cases in a like
manner is indisputable but formal.1 7 It leaves open the question of
when two cases are alike or when two people are similarly situated.
It must be supplemented with a theory about "likeness." What sort
of difference is relevant or irrelevant when decisions about the
treatment of individuals are made? When are people alike and
when are they different in a morally relevant sense?
The abstract principle of human equality provides substance
for the precept "treat like alike." Each person is a human being and
therefore alike in that important respect - in the things they share
by virtue of being human. The equality of human beings means that
the value or worth of a person does not vary depending on his or
her race or sex. Nor does it vary depending on the extent to which
he or she is able to develop and exercise his or her human
capacities. It is the existence of these capacities, and not the extent
of their realization, that is the basis of human value.1 8 Intelligence
and moral sensitivity are valuable and the state should do its best to
create an environment in which these capacities may develop and
flourish, but the life of an intelligent, morally sensitive person is not
of greater intrinsic worth than the life of another less intelligent or
less moral person.
III. IRRATIONALITY AND PREJUDICE
Clearly it is wrong to treat two individuals differently when
there is no reason for differentiating between them. This much
follows from the formal principle that like cases ought to be treated
alike.19 The right to equality forbids the making of arbitrary
distinctions. Human beings are of equal worth and so ought to be
treated alike unless there is some reason for distinguishing between
17 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (London: Oxford University Press, 1961) at 155.
18 S. Lukes, Individualisn (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985) at 126.
No doubt contributing to this attitude is a recognition that the development of an individual's

capacities is dependent upon his or her social environment.
19 B. Williams, 'The Ideal of Equality' in H. Bedau, ed., Justice and Equality (Englewood

Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971) 116 at 119.
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them. This is the element of truth in Hogg's claim that laws should
have universal application.
But the wrong that occurs when
arbitrary distinctions are made is not the failure to treat all people
identically, a "wrong" which may sometimes be overridden by a
competing interest which requires differential treatment. Rather, the
wrong is the differential treatment of people for no reason. The
irrationality of the distinction is the basis of the wrong. To treat
two people differently without reason is to fail to treat them as
persons of equal worth.
Concern for the rationality of legislative decision making
underlies the test of minimal scrutiny employed by the American
courts in their review of non-suspect legislative classifications under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
Minimal scrutiny involves the
examination of a legislative classification to ensure that it advances
a sensible purpose and that it is neither (unnecessarily) overinclusive nor under-inclusive as a means to the law's proper ends.
A non-suspect classification will be upheld if there is "a state of
facts that reasonably can be conceived to constitute a distinction or
difference in state policy.... '21 The courts, however, very seldom
strike down legislation on the basis of this minimal scrutiny, for
there is almost always some reason to explain the use of a particular
legal classification.
Not just any reason, though, will justify differential treatment
of individuals. From the claim of equal human worth, it follows that
a certain kind of reason will not justify differential treatment: no
one should be treated differently because he or she is thought to be
intrinsically more or less worthy than others. This sort of reason is
regarded as "illegitimate" or "irrelevant" and is excluded by the right
to equality.
The view that the members of a particular class, race, or
religion are less worthy or less "human" than others is sometimes
referred to as prejudice and actions based on this view are
sometimes referred to as discrimination. Prejudice is generally

20 In American jurisprudence, suspect classifications include race and nationality. The

use of these classifications is subject to strict scrutiny. Other classifications are not suspect
and so are subject to a lesser standard of scrutiny (intermediate or minimal).
21 Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers Tax Commission of Ohio (1959), 358 U.S. 522 at 530.
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expressed through the use of stereotypes. Stereotyping involves the
attribution of a particular trait to the members of a group.
Sometimes the attribution makes sense in that the attributed
characteristic is common among the group's members. But other
times, the attribution has no basis whatsoever because the trait is no
more common among the group's members than it is among the
general population.
The use of stereotypes as an expression of prejudice usually
involves a claim that the members of a particular group share a
certain undesirable characteristic; a characteristic relevant in the
distribution of social burdens and benefits - for example,
intelligence, responsibility, and strength which are relevant to the
performance of certain jobs. The bigot does not argue that the
members of certain groups are less worthy because of their skin
colour or religion, rather he or she argues that they are less
deserving because of certain socially relevant traits which correlate
with skin colour or religion. An illegitimate ground of distinction is
concealed behind a legitimate ground.22
The right to equality is concerned with certain "illegitimate"
reasons for action. These reasons, prejudice of various kinds, will
not justify the differential treatment of individuals. One person is
not "unlike" another merely because he or she is of another race,
religion, or class. Unless there is some legitimate reason for treating
him or her differently, the principle of equality requires that he or
she be treated the same as others. An act which is "motivated" by
improper reasons is tainted. Regardless of the "objective" worth of
the act, if prejudice has been a factor in the decision-making process
leading to it, the right to equality will have been violated. In this
sense, the wrong is content-independent. The wrong relates to the
reasons or motives for the action, not to the content of the chosen
action.
There are many reasons for treating individuals differently
which do not involve prejudice. The right to equality does not
forbid legislative recognition of the different abilities, interests, and
needs of the members of the community. Medical care may
appropriately be provided to those who need it rather than to every
22 See Williams, supra, note 19 at 119.
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person equally regardless of their health. Higher education or
special skills training may be provided to those who have the
interest and ability which allow them to take advantage of it. As
long as the particular distinction does not reflect a belief that some
members of the community are deserving of greater concern and
consideration than others, then it cannot be attacked as a prejudicebased breach of the right to equality.
A. Intentional Discrimination
In the United States, the constitutional right to the equal
protection of the laws has been interpreted as prohibiting intentional
discrimination by the state. The Supreme Court of the United
States declared, in Washington v. Davis, that the equal protection
clause was concerned with "purpose or intent" to discriminate. 23 In
the Court's view, "the basic equal protection principle [is] that the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."2 4 Speaking
for the majority of the Supreme Court in PersonnelAdministrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, Justice Stewart stated that:
"Discriminatory purpose" ... implies that the decision maker, in this case a state
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
"because5 of," not merely "in spite of," its adverse effects upon an identifiable
2

group.

The Court has made it clear that the equal protection clause is
concerned with the motive or purpose behind the law and not with
the law's effect.
However, the American decisions do not clearly or
consistently equate intentional discrimination with prejudice-based
decision making. At times, the American courts seemed to say that
the objectionable intention is not the intention to harm a particular

23 Supra, note 9.
24 Ibid. at 2048.
25 Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney (1979), 99 S.Ct. 2282 at 2296

[hereinafter Feeney].
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group or to treat some groups as less worthy or deserving (to act
out of prejudice), but is rather the intention to employ a particular
classification, no more than the26intention to use race, gender, or
religion as legislative categories.
There are, however, good reasons to reject the view that the
right to equality forbids the simple intention to use certain legislative
The equal
categories (discrimination in the neutral sense).
protection clause in the American Bill of Rights and section 15 of
the Charter of Rights are both open-ended; they do not limit their
protection to particular groups. Section 15 specifically names certain
classifications but clearly states that its protection is not limited to
those classifications. If section 15 is interpreted as prohibiting the
intention to distinguish on the basis of a protected classification,
then the use of any classification is forbidden. Any law which
distinguishes one group of persons from another group involves the
intention to "discriminate" on the basis of group membership.
The American courts have not interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment as forbidding every use of classification. They have
interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as prohibiting the intention
to differentiate on certain grounds only, grounds such as race and
gender. 27 But this restriction on the scope of the right begs the
question, why show concern for only these classifications? If any
sense is to be made of the intention-based account of the right to
equality, then the forbidden intention must be the intention to
disadvantage a particular group because its members are regarded as
intrinsically less worthy or deserving, and not the mere intention to
distinguish on a particular ground. The court's concern for racial,
religious, and other groups is sensible only if a prejudice-based view
of the right is adopted.
The language of section 15 in the CanadianCharterof Rights
and Freedoms may be taken as adopting the intention-based view of
the right to equality. The phrase "the equal protection of the laws"
used in section 15 is borrowed from the American Fourteenth
Amendment. As well, the specific mention in section 15 of groups
26 Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), 98 S.Ct. 2733 [hereinafter
Bakke].
27 Of course, minimal scrutiny applies to all laws; a basic rationality test.
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that have historically been the victims of prejudice, evokes the idea
of "suspect classifications" and the process of "strict scrutiny," both
of which are central to the judicial protection against prejudicebased decision making in the United States.
There are difficulties with an interpretation of the equality
right which requires that the courts determine whether an act of the
state has been motivated by prejudice. Legislators seldom admit
that prejudice has played a part in their decision. And when
prejudice does play a part in a decision, it usually plays only a part;
one of many factors. Intention to discriminate is difficult to discover
and difficult to prove. The burden of proof on the person alleging
discrimination is sometimes insurmountable.
Beyond problems of discovery and proof, it has been
suggested that there is no such thing as legislative intention. The
act of a single administrator can sensibly be said to be motivated by
reasons including prejudice, but the act of a collective body, such as
a legislature, cannot. The legislature does not have an intention,
only its members do and they may support a particular statute for a
variety of different and even conflicting reasons.
Without question, the courts play a creative role when they
attempt to determine the purpose of a law. But the idea of
legislative motivation is certainly not senseless. Laws are capable of
interpretation because they are human acts intended to achieve
certain goals. Not all legislators will have acted for the same
reasons, and their reasons may range from the specific to the
general. When the courts interpret a law, they endeavour to
articulate the purposes of the legislators when they enacted the law.
The creators of a particular law often agree on the general purpose
of the law and usually act for the same or similar reasons. A court
can identify some of the legislature's reasons for action from the
context of the legislation, particularly if the court assumes that the
law is the
act of a human organization concerned with the public
28
welfare.
However, there is a deeper problem with the idea of
intentional discrimination, concerning its "intentional" or "conscious"

28 For a recent consideration of the question of intent and interpretation, see R.
Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
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character. Discrimination does not generally involve a conscious
effort to harm or disadvantage a particular group. Discrimination
operates at an unconscious or irrational level and involves a reliance
upon various assumptions and beliefs about a group - assumptions
which are current in the larger community and have been
internalized by the individual actor.
B. Suspect Classifications and Strict Scrutiny
As a result of these difficulties, the American courts, when
endeavouring to detect prejudice-based discrimination, have relied on
"objective' indicators of intention. The courts have focused on the
use of particular classifications and the relation of means (the
classification used) to ends (the legitimate purposes that may be
attributed to the law). When race or religion are used as legal
classifications, the courts are suspicious that prejudice has been a
consideration in the law-making process. Judicial suspicion is
aroused because the members of certain racial and religious groups
have traditionally been victims of prejudice and because race and
religion are rarely relevant to the achievement of a legitimate social
goal. When put in issue before the American courts, these "suspect"
classifications have been subjected to "strict scrutiny," while other
29
classifications have been subjected to a lesser standard of review.
Strict scrutiny has two aspects. Before the courts will give their
consent to a "suspect" classification, they must be convinced that the
classification is necessary to achieve the object of the law and that
the law's object represents a compelling state interest. 30
When the legislature makes use of a suspect classification,
the courts consider whether the classification is necessary for the
achievement of a legitimate social end. If another classification

29 A third level of scrutiny - intermediate scrutiny - has emerged recently. See Craig
v. Boren (1976), 97 S.Ct. 451.

30 To illustrate: A law which prohibits natives from being intoxicated away from the
reserve when no such prohibition affects non-natives can only be justified if one accepts
certain views about natives. The purpose of the law is not simply to restrict drunkenness; it
is to restrict drunkenness among natives. Underlying the law is a paternalistic attitude towards
natives; a view that natives are not capable of making decisions when non-natives are capable.
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would more efficiently advance the law's legitimate purpose, then it
is reasonable to conclude that the legislature has engaged in some
unfair stereotyping, drawing on prejudiced attitudes. In looking for
some indication that the legislative decision was tainted by prejudice,
the courts make a judgment about the utility of the means employed
to achieve the chosen end.31
The courts also pass judgment on the value of certain ends.
Are the (claimed) ends of the law important enough to account for
the disadvantageous effect of the law on a particular group? When
a law detrimentally affects a group that has traditionally been the
victim of prejudice, particularly when a "fundamental interest" is
involved, the courts require that the law's purpose be very important.
By requiring this, the courts ensure that no part of the law's
justification stems from an attitude of prejudice. The courts balance
the importance of the law's particular end against the detrimental
effect the law has on the particular group. This process allows the
courts to judge whether the legislature was willing to sacrifice the
interests of the group to the law's end because it had prejudiced
views about the group.
The courts also look closely at laws which employ nonsuspect classifications but which have a disproportionate impact on
groups which historically have been victims of prejudice. Laws of
this sort may involve concealed prejudice. The legislators may have
passed the law precisely because of the detrimental impact it has on
the group.
This practice is often referred to as "indirect"
discrimination. Indirect discrimination involves an intention to
discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or gender; the intention
32
is simply concealed behind neutral criteria.
31 G. Gunther, "Foreword:

In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A

Model for a Newer Equal Protcction" (1972) 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1 at 21.
32

"Indirect discrimination" has another sense. It is sometimes used as another term for

constructive or effects discrimination.
coincidence.

The dual meaning of the term is, I believe, no

The use of stereotype or generalization does not necessarily involve prejudice. It is not
always possible for the law to provide individualized treatment. Generalizations may be made

about non-suspect groups (and perhaps even suspect groups) when there appears to be no
other way to achieve a particular social goal. When there is'
no other way to achieve a
legitimate social end, a law which makes an assumption about a group which may be unfair
to some of its members can be explained without finding a prejudiced attitude behind it.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 26 No. 4

C. Affinnative Action and Discrimination
Racial and other suspect classifications might be used for
reasons other than prejudice. Although race is not usually relevant
to the achievement of a legitimate social purpose, there are social
goals to which it may be relevant so that its use as a legislative
classification can be explained without finding prejudice as a
motivating factor. However, the American courts have sometimes
said that racial classification is wrongful per se. The Constitution has
been described as "colour-blind."33 It is said that to justify the
"wrong" that occurs when a racial classification is used, there must
be a very strong countervailing governmental interest. Perhaps no
interest will ever be sufficient to override the prohibition on the use
of such classifications.
The constitutional debate in the United States about
affirmative action illustrates this uncertainty about the use of racial
and other "suspect" classifications. If the courts were only concerned
with prejudice, then affirmative action for blacks, women, and other
groups would not present constitutional difficulties. The purpose of
affirmative action programmes is the advancement of members of a
group that has historically been disadvantaged, often because of
prejudice. Whatever the value of such programmes, they are a
response to prejudice, and not an expression of it.
Yet in the Bakke case, the majority of the American
Supreme Court approached the question of the constitutionality of
an affirmative action programme just as they would the
constitutionality of any legislative or administrative use of a racial
classification 4 In the view of Chief Justice Burger and Justices

As an example, mandatory retirement of judges at a particular age may be unfair to those
judges who are quite capable of carrying on their duties. Nevertheless, the nature of the
position of judge (and concern for judicial independence) makes individual assessment of a
judge's ability to carry on his or her duties inappropriate.
33 Plessy v. Ferguson (1896), 163 U.S. 537 at 559 (Harlan J.dissenting).
34
Bakke, supra, note 26 at 2750. In Canada, the problem of affirmative action is avoided
by s. 15(2) of the Charter.

1988]

Equality Rights Under the Charter

Stewart, Rehnquist and Stevens, the state was, without exception,
prohibited from using racial classifications. Justice Powell, who
wrote the deciding judgment, took a slightly different view of the
issue. According to Powell, once a racial classification is used, the
state must show that its use is necessary to the achievement of a
compelling state interest and that there is no other way to achieve
that end.3s
Both of these views confuse the test and the wrong. The
wrong is prejudice-based decision making; the use of a suspect
classification is evidence of prejudice in the legislative decisionmaking process. The colour-blind approach has the advantage of
simplicity, but is not sufficiently subtle given the present interest in
overcoming societal prejudice. A racial classification which benefits
a disadvantaged minority group (a group historically subjected to
prejudice) ought not to be precluded or even strictly examined and
required to advance efficiently a compelling social purpose. Such
programmes clearly are not motivated by prejudice which is what the
test of strict scrutiny is designed to detect.
D. The Problem with IntentionalDiscriminationand the Dift towards
Constuctive Discrimination
In a similar way, the occurrence of disproportionate impact
(disadvantageous effect) on a particular group is sometimes taken as
the standard of equality or non-discrimination and not simply as a
test for prejudice in legislative decision making. Certain judicial
decisions in the United States have suggested that the right to
equality is violated when a law has a disproportionate impact on a
disadvantaged group.3 6 However, the American Supreme Court has
clearly stated that disproportionate impact is not itself wrongful
7
under the Fourteenth Amendment

35 Ibid at 2756.
36 For example, Swarm v. Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education (1971), 91 S.Ct.

1267.
37 Washington v. Davis, supra, note 9.
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The history and language of section 15 lend some support to
the view that a violation of the right to equality occurs when a law
has a disproportionate impact on the members of a particular group,
and the reason for the differential impact is trivial in comparison to
the disadvantage it brings. This interpretation of section 15 is
suggested by the inclusion of a right to the equal benefit of the law
and the specific mention of age and handicap as grounds of
discrimination. The elderly and the handicapped are less victims of
prejudice than of indifference - indifference to their particular
concerns and interests. They are forgotten by the legislator who
tends to think only of the "average" person. This interpretation of
Supreme Court, has
section 15 although rejected by the American
38
Courts.
Canadian
in
support
some early
The shift from effects as test to effects as standard is perhaps
inevitable given the difficulties faced by an intention-based version
of the right to equality. A conception of the right to equality which
focuses on intention is confronted not only with the problem of
determining intention which involves considerable reliance on
objective factors (the assessment of ends and means), but also with
the more fundamental problem of the ambiguity which surrounds the
concepts of intention and prejudice.
The "exercise" of prejudice (discrimination) seldom involves
carefully thought out actions which are performed with the specific
Generally,
intention of disadvantaging a particular group.
discrimination involves a failure to take adequate account of a
group's interests rather than a conscious effort to disadvantage the
group's members and is the result of a reliance on inaccurate and
simplistic generalizations about the group's members. The adoption
by an individual of an inaccurate and unfair stereotype concerning
a particular group is usually no more than an unreflective
internalization of a generally held view, a larger cultural assumption
about other groups, and acceptable ways of living and behaving. For
instance, prejudice against women usually takes the form of
paternalism, the view that women are in need of special protection
from the harshness of life. Those who regard women as somehow
less capable do not consciously intend to disadvantage women,
38 See supra, note 10.
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although that is generally the effect of their protective actions. A
generalization of this sort is unfair because it is simplistic and
inaccurate but also because it plays an important part in the
systematic subordination of women. Once it is recognized that
discrimination is not simply the product of the autonomous will of
an individual but stems rather from larger cultural attitudes, it
becomes necessary to look at social context in order to identify
discrimination and recognize its harmful character, and it becomes
clearer that discrimination is pervasive in the community and not
simply a discrete and aberrant act.
The transformation of disproportionate impact from test to
standard is easily made not just because of problems related to the
concepts of intention and prejudice but also because concern with
the outcome or substance of laws follows from the idea of human
If the courts accept that the right to equality has
equality.
implications for the results of legislative decision making and not just
for the process of decision making, then the prejudice-based account
But to understand
of the right may be left far behind.
disproportionate impact as a violation of the right to equality, we
must extend our understanding of the right to include concern for
the welfare and status of individuals in the community.
IV. EQUALITY OF RESULT
The right to equality, interpreted as a prohibition of
prejudice-based decision making, involves the exclusion of certain
reasons for action. The wrong proscribed is an intentional act. It
is wrong to intend to treat an individual as less than a full member
of the human community. If the state decides to allocate certain
benefits or burdens, it cannot distribute them differently among
individuals because it considers some individuals to be intrinsically
less worthy than others. No positive duties fall upon the state as a
consequence of the prohibition of prejudice-based decision making.
The state is not required to take any particular action, nor is it
prevented from acting provided it does so for proper reasons.
But the principle of human equality has implications for the
substance of legislation and not simply for the process of legislative
decision making. If all individuals are of equal worth, and if the life
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and development of each individual matters and matters equally,
then the state should work to advance the interests of each and
every one of its citizens. The benefits and burdens of community
should be distributed in a way that shows equal concern and
consideration for the needs and interests of all. The state does
wrong when it ignores for any or for no reason the interests of a
certain group of individuals or when it sacrifices the interests of a
certain group to the interests of other groups. The state must show
concern for the position or status within the community of each
individual. "Equality" is then a goal of law and not simply a
principle governing the motives of legislators and the reasons for
legislative action.
What must the state do to show equal concern and
consideration for all its citizens? The content of the state's
obligation depends on what we decide gives value to human life the qualities or capacities which are distinctive to humans. If human
beings are valuable because of certain capacities they share - to
think, to make moral judgments, to make life plans, to form
relationships with others, and to reflect upon their own character,
values, and choices - then the right to equality will require that the
state make an equal effort to advance these capacities in each
individual. Each individual should be given the fullest opportunity
to realize his or her capacity for self-development. 39
Lukes, supra, note 18 at 134.
For the utilitarian, a human being is valuable because he or she is capable of
experiencing pain or pleasure or because he or she has desires and purposes and is able to
make choices. According to the utilitarian, the proper course for both the individual and the
state is to maximize the aggregate of individual utilities - utility referring to pleasure or
preference satisfaction, or some other subjective experience. The idea of human equality is
expressed in the principle that the utility of each person counts equally in the aggregation
process. One person's utility will count no more and no less than another's in the decision
as to the proper course of conduct for the individual or the state.
The complaint has been made that the utilitarian method of aggregating utilities may
result in a very unequal distribution of social benefits among individuals. If equality enters
into the process at the level of aggregation, then the individual may sometimes be sacrificed
to the whole. But an element of equality of result may find its way into utilitarian calculation.
Bentham, in particular, assumed that the more an individual has of a particular good, the less
satisfaction he or she receives from additional units of the good. It is said to follow from this
that the maximization of overall satisfaction will occur when goods are equally distributed.
Whether utilitarians support this indirect and contingent right to equality of result
or a more direct version of the right (requiring the state to advance the utility of each person
equally), the results, equal or aggregative, are to be measured in terms of utility. The
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The right to equality requires that individuals be treated as
"equals." It does not require that they be made equal - that each
person develop to the same level as everyone else so that all persons
come to have the same interests and abilities. More particularly, the
right to equality cannot justify efforts by the state to reduce the
abilities of some individuals to the level of the rest of the
population. This is not so much a limit on the right (that we value
things which compete or conflict with equality) as part of the larger
idea of human worth from which the right to equality springs.
Human beings are valuable, individually and equally, because they
share certain capacities. The right to equality cannot be separated
from this background of human value since the right depends upon
this background for its justification and substance. If certain human
capacities are valuable, then it follows that the state should
encourage their development. The principle of equality simply adds
that what is valuable in one is valuable in all, and that the state
must try to advance the interests of each and every individual
without favouring some at the expense of others.
The requirements of equality are complex. Some things
should be made available "equally" (in like amounts); in particular,
necessities of life such as food, clothing, and shelter. Other things
are more appropriately distributed on an "unequal" basis.
Differential treatment may be justified for many reasons, notably,
giving certain limited advantages to those who can best take
advantage of them (higher education) or have the greatest need for
them (medical care), placing certain obligations and giving certain
incentives to those most able to perform tasks which benefit the
whole community, and rewarding those who have contributed to the
community by displaying virtues which should be acknowledged and
encouraged.

difficulties in measuring utility (subjective satisfaction) and comparing the utilities of different

individuals are notorious. How is the strength of preferences to be measured and compared?
More importantly, though, is this the sort of equality of result that the state should
be seeking to achieve - equality of pleasure or preference satisfaction? Why should we value
preferences regardless of what they may be for? It is difficult to accept that the realization
of an individual's humanity occurs through the maximization of his or her preference
satisfaction and that equality occurs through the equal satisfaction of preferences among the
citizens of the political community.
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Once we reject the claim that equality is achieved by
distributing the same packages of goods to each individual, or that
there is a single criterion for measuring and comparing alternative
distributions of social resources (for example, equal preference
satisfaction), it is apparent that there is no single correct distribution
which is discoverable and which satisfies the right to equality. The
needs and interests of individuals are many, as are the benefits
offered by society. The state can never fully satisfy all needs and
interests. Choices and tradeoffs must be made. To add to this
complexity, the distribution of social benefits can be achieved
through a variety of different schemes, including the free market and
various forms of state initiative. In respecting
the right to equality,
40
discretion.
considerable
has
state
the
But even if there is no one distribution of social benefits and
burdens which is precisely equal and therefore required by the right
to equality, there are distributions which violate the right. There is
a point at which the distribution of benefits and burdens clearly
favours the interests of some over others so that it becomes
apparent that the state has not given equal consideration to the
interests of all individuals. Too often, some individuals or groups
are excluded from the opportunities available to develop themselves,
to fulfill goals and desires, and to share in the benefits of the
community. Inequality may occur even though the law makers do
not intend to limit or disadvantage the particular individual or group
and even though the laws which govern the distribution have
sensible reasons behind them.
For a variety of reasons, the interests of a particular
individual or group may be lost sight of in the decision-making
process. Law making sometimes reflects cultural assumptions which,
although not properly characterized as prejudice, may have a
detrimental effect on certain groups and may limit the expression of
different lifestyles and cultures. As well, the interests of some
individuals are sometimes overlooked in the narrow pursuit of
particular goals. Finally, disadvantages tend to accumulate. An
individual, who is denied certain educational opportunities, will find
him or herself limited in his or her ability to find interesting and
40 See generally, M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983).
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meaningful work and excluded from high paying jobs and benefits
that depend on purchasing power.
V. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCRIMINATION
Concern for equality of result is expressed in the
interpretation of section 15 as a prohibition of "effects" or
"constructive" discrimination. "Constructive" discrimination occurs
when an act of the state adds to the disadvantage of an already
disadvantaged group. According to this interpretation of section 15,
if a law has a disproportionate impact on a disadvantaged group, it
will prima facie violate the Charter Once a prima facie violation is
found, the court must then consider whether the reasons for the law
are significant enough to justify its disadvantageous effect on the
group's members. It is not enough that the law is supported by a
legitimate reason; that reason must be substantial enough to justify
the law's detrimental impact on some individuals. A violation of the
Charterwill be found when the reason for excluding some individuals
from the law's benefit is insignificant when compared to the
disadvantage they suffer by exclusion.
The focus of review for "constructive" discrimination is on
disadvantaged groups. Review for "constructive" discrimination seeks
the removal of barriers that limit the opportunity of these groups to
participate fully in the benefits of society. The review also focuses
on fundamental human interests, such as education, food, shelter,
employment, and health care; interests which are basic to the welfare
of all, and which must be satisfied if individuals are to have wider
opportunities to participate in the community.
The failure of a government to construct public facilities
accessible to wheelchairs has a significant impact on a group which
already faces many difficulties. A regulation which requires all
construction workers to wear hard hats has the effect of excluding
Sikhs from employment in construction.
A minimum height
requirement for entry into the police force indirectly limits the access
of women and certain racial groups to this employment. In each of
these cases, a particular group which is already disadvantaged in our
society is excluded from an important social benefit. Each of these
state acts has a sensible purpose behind it and can be explained
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without assuming prejudice on the part of the decision makers - the
expense of wheelchair ramps (for existing buildings), the safety of
hard hats, and the need for strong and physically able policemen or
policewomen. The court must decide whether these purposes are
important enough to outweigh the disadvantage suffered by the
particular group. If these purposes are not considered significant,
then the law will amount to constructive discrimination, a failure by
the state to take adequate account of the interests of all its citizens.
Whether a law which has a disadvantageous impact can be
justified under the Charter will depend on a variety of factors,
including whether the group is in a subordinate social or economic
position (the relative position of Sikhs), whether a fundamental
interest is being denied the group members (employment), whether
they have other opportunities which compensate for, or at least
alleviate, the harshness of the law (access to other employment
opportunities), whether the trait which has been the basis for
differential treatment is important to the group's identity (turbans
and the importance attached to religious freedom and expression),
whether the social goal behind differential treatment is important
(worker safety), and whether the goal could be achieved by other
means (other ways of ensuring worker safety).
Many of the commentators who interpret the equality right
as a prohibition of constructive discrimination play down the
substantial character of this version of the right. The prohibition of
constructive discrimination, they say, is a matter of equality of
opportunity and not equality of result. 41 They claim that review for
constructive discrimination is concerned with removing the barriers
confronting individuals in the competition for social goods rather
than with equalizing the outcome of the distribution of social goods.
Review for constructive discrimination simply reflects the principle
that everyone should be allowed to compete fairly.
But what is involved in making the competition fair? Review
for constructive discrimination is concerned with more than the
removal of "arbitrary" barriers to competition for benefits. Any
barrier that limits the opportunity of a group of individuals to
41 R. Abella, Equality in Employment (Ottawa:

Ministry of Supply and Services, 1984)

at 2; C. McCrudden, "Institutional Discrimination" (1982) 2 Oxford J. Leg. Stud. 303; W.

Black, "From Intent to Effect: New Standards in Human Rights" (1980) 1 C.H.R.R. C/1.

1988]

Equality Rights Under the Charter

develop and to participate in society's benefits should be removed
unless necessary for some vital social goal. Review for constructive
discrimination, then, is not simply concerned with rules of
competition which are neutral towards the outcome of the
competition. It is concerned with effects and seeks to structure the
competition so that it results in a fairer and more balanced
distribution of social benefits. Once review becomes concerned not
only with "arbitrary" barriers to action (such as prejudice) but also
with the opportunities available to individuals to develop fully as
human beings and to participate in a variety of social goods, it
assumes a positive, results-oriented character. The state is under a
duty to work with equal effort to advance the interests of all
individuals. It must not advance the interests of some while
inhibiting or ignoring the interests of others. Values other than
equality must be accommodated but the goal is a form of equality of
result.
A.

The Limited Scope of Constructive Discrimination

Review for constructive discrimination advances a form of
equality of result. However, the pursuit of this end is constrained
and distorted by the structural and political limits of adjudication.
In a legislative democracy, where the primary responsibility for
ordering society is thought to lie with the elected branches of
government, there should be some limits to judicial review. Some
scope should remain for legislative judgment which is not reviewable
in the courts. As well, judicial review must be limited because the
adjudicative process is designed to deal with discrete wrongs
(violations of a defined right) and not with systemic injustice or
inequality.
Review for constructive discrimination focuses on the effect
of particular laws and the fate of particular groups and does not
attempt to restructure the overall distribution of benefits in the
community. The focus on state action means that emphasis is placed
on the removal of laws which add to the unfairness of the
distribution of social benefits rather than on the direct
(re)distribution of resources by an interventionist state. As well,
even if a law has a disadvantageous effect on a protected group, that
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effect will be justified (permitted) if a significant purpose can be
attributed to the law. Limited in these ways, review for constructive
discrimination appears to be a slight extension of the prejudice-based
view of equality. The deep egalitarianism involved in equality of
result is avoided. The courts are not called upon to review and
revise the complex distribution of benefits and burdens in the
community.
Yet even this limited protection of equality of result will not
fit comfortably within the boundaries of the adjudicative process.
Review for constructive discrimination places a strain on the
adjudicative process and the political legitimacy of judicial review.
B. DisadvantagedGroups
Review for constructive discrimination tends to focus on the
status of certain disadvantaged groups. This focus is appropriate
since the requirements of the right to equality are imprecise. There
is no one fair, just, and equitable distribution of social benefits.
There is simply a range of acceptable - reasonably fair and equal distributions. The focus on groups, which have historically been less
well off, limits judicial intervention in the law-making process to
those occasions when the state aggravates the situation of a
disadvantaged group. The legislature is not compelled to justify
every law that has a disadvantageous effect on one or more
individuals. It need only justify laws which add to the disadvantage
of an already disadvantaged group - clear breaches of the right to
equality.
This focus on disadvantaged groups strengthens the
connection between review for constructive discrimination and review
for prejudice. Generally, the same groups of individuals are the
focus in either type of review - suspect classifications and
disadvantaged groups. According to the prejudice-based version of
the right, the state is prohibited from intentionally treating an
individual as less worthy of concern and consideration than others.
Since prejudice is usually aimed at groups of individuals and involves
the use of stereotypes, protection against prejudice-based decision
Review for constructive
making tends to focus on groups.
discrimination, however, requires the state to show equal concern
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and consideration for the needs and interests of all individuals.
Since disadvantage is usually generalized in some way, the courts
seek to identify and remedy disadvantage by examining the relative
position of groups in the community and preventing the state from
aggravating the position of disadvantaged groups.
This connection between review for constructive
discrimination and review for prejudice appears to have caused some
confusion. Many of the proponents of review for constructive
discrimination seem to be concerned only with the relative position
of certain groups - groups that have historically been the victims of
prejudice. 42 They argue that review for constructive discrimination
should ensure that society is structured so that these particular
groups have a share of the community's benefits which is equal, or
at least proportionate, to the share of other groups. There is no
suggestion that all persons should be treated equally by the state,
and that the presence of any disadvantaged group in the community
is contrary to the equality right. Notably, there is an apparent
indifference shown by the proponents of review for constructive
discrimination to poverty and to the poor as a group.
It appears that many of those who argue that section 15
should protect against constructive discrimination want to limit its
protection to groups such as women, native people, and the
handicapped. Yet why should the right to equality, expressed in the
restriction of constructive discrimination, be limited to the protection
of these groups? It is not simply wrong that a large number of
women, native people, or handicapped people are excluded from the
benefits society offers; it is wrong that anyone should be excluded.
By focusing on the unequal position of these groups, the proponents
of review for construction discrimination appear to avoid the full
implications of the right to equality. The right appears to be no
more than a simple extension of the prohibition of prejudice-based
decision making; an extension which trades on the intuition that
something wrong has happened when there are few black doctors
and women judges.

42

O. Fiss, "Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" in M. Cohen, T. Nagel, & T.

Scanlon, eds, Equality and PreferentialTreatment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977)
at 84.
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The right to equality should protect all who are
disadvantaged and not simply those groups that have been the
victims of prejudice. The prohibition of constructive discrimination,
as it is set out by its leading proponents, simply redraws the lines of
inequality. There is no effort to dissolve the class of disadvantaged
43
citizens. All that is sought is a redefinition of the "underclass."
Perhaps it would be simple enough to add the poor to the
list of protected groups. However, the addition of the poor to the
list of protected groups would underline other problems related to
review for constructive discrimination. In particular, it would
underline the limits on judicial review represented by the state action
doctrine and the adjudicative model.
C. The Adjudicative Model and the Doctuine of State Action
The traditional model of constitutional adjudication supports
a limited approach to review for inequality. An equality case
conducted within the traditional model will focus on a particular law
which is the subject of a dispute between a limited number of
parties. Constructive discrimination will be found when a law or
other act of the state has a disproportionate impact on a
disadvantaged group. This focus on the effect of a particular law
suggests that a violation of the right to equality occurs as a discrete
wrong, as a particular positive act by the state, and that the
vindication of the right involves the removal of barriers to equal
opportunity erected by the state.
But if the right to equality is concerned with the position or
status of individuals or groups in our society (their welfare and their
development), then a determination that inequality exists in our
community can only be made after the court has considered the
effect of the entire legal order on the relative position of the
community's members. A violation of the right occurs not as a
discrete act but as a general position or status of inequality or
disadvantage in society (for example, poverty). The disadvantaged
position of groups and individuals is not the result of any one
43A distinction between bloc-regarding equality and individual-regarding equality is made
in D. Rae, Equalities (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981) at 39.
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particular law. The distribution of social benefits occurs in a variety
of ways, as required and permitted by the law. An imbalance or
unfairness in the distribution of social benefits is the product of the
general social order.
Even if the issue of constructive discrimination arises in the
context of a legal action which involves a limited number of parties
and focuses on the legitimacy of a particular law, the investigation
of the court inevitably takes it beyond a simple examination of the
provisions of the particular law and the effect of that law on the
particular parties. The courts must assess the position of the group
in society: is the group "discrete and insular" or generally in a
disadvantaged position in relation to the rest of the community? A
decision on this will require the courts to examine the wider social
system and the overall distribution of social benefits. A particular
law triggers review, but judicial consideration must extend to the
general system of laws.
The doctrine of state action places a significant limit on the
scope of judicial review. The state action doctrine holds that a
constitutional wrong only occurs when the state has taken action either an act of law-making or an administrative act. The state does
not violate a constitutional right if it simply declines to take action,
as when it fails to prohibit private discrimination. The courts are
not free to embark upon a general assessment of the social order,
correcting omissions in the law and excesses in private sector activity.
Before the courts may intervene, there must be some act by the
state which can be attacked as contrary to the right to equality.
In the United States, the doctrine of state action has had a
troubled existence. 44 Dissatisfaction with the doctrine has usually
focused on the problem of private acts of discrimination. If it is
wrong for the state to make decisions for reasons of prejudice, then
it is also wrong for a private citizen to do so, particularly since so
many social goods are distributed through the market. The state
action doctrine may be enlarged (or perhaps avoided) in one of two
ways: the courts may find that a particular actor should be

C. Black, "Forward: State Action, Equal Protection, and California's Proposition
14"
(1967) 81 Harv. L. Rev. 69.
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considered a state actor or they may find that the state has
itself
45
discriminated by permitting a private actor to discriminate.
In the context of review for constructive discrimination,
dissatisfaction with the doctrine of state action focuses not on the
failure to prohibit acts of discrimination in the private sector, but
instead on the requirement of action itself, state, or otherwise.
Equality of result is concerned with the relative position of
individuals in the community. Inequality occurs not as a particular
"positive" act of the state (for example, an act motivated by improper
considerations), but as an unfair distribution of social benefits or a
position of social and economic disadvantage. Inequality is as much
the result of a failure by the state to act, as it is of state action. If
the legislature is to respect the right to equality, then it must avoid
discrete acts of discrimination and also act positively to ensure that
a fair distribution of benefits and burdens is obtained in the
community - from the complex system of legislative and private
decisions.
Since all private power can be seen to originate with the
state (with the social rules that are created and enforced by the
state) the state could be seen as responsible for the overall
distribution of wealth (and, indeed, for all private actions). But, if
the distinction between state acts and omissions were overridden,
then little would remain of the state action doctrine. Judicial
intervention into the social and economic order would be without
46
limits.

45 In Blainey, supra, note 10, it appears that the state action was the unequal distribution

of protection against private discrimination.
46

The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in Retai Wholesale and Dept. Store
Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivety [19861 2 S.C.R. 576 was released several months after
this paper was written. The Supreme Court has now given its backing to a version of the

state action doctrine.
For a recent and interesting discussion of the state action doctrine, see H. Lessard, 'The
Idea of the Private: A Discussion of State Action Doctrine and Separate Sphere Ideology"
(1986) 9 Dalhousie LJ. 107.
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D. Justification
A law will amount to constructive discrimination only if it
disadvantages a particular group of individuals without sufficient
justification. Once the court finds that a particular law has a
disproportionate impact on a disadvantaged group, it must then
consider if the law is necessary to the achievement of an important
social goal.
In passing the law, the legislature may have been
aware that the law had disadvantages for a certain group, but
decided that this was a necessary price for the achievement of an
important goal. All governments are faced with the problem of a
wide variety of claims on limited resources. They must make hard
choices about the allocation of resources; choices which have far
reaching implications. Should the state be required to build ramps
for the handicapped in all public buildings? A court cannot answer
a question of this sort without considering a variety of contextual
factors. The court must consider the impact of "no ramps" on the
handicapped. It must also consider the cost of the ramps and
recognize that the resources needed to build them will have to come
from somewhere; will other services have to be sacrificed? A
decision by the court that the legislature must devote resources to
a specific project resonates throughout the system of legislative
47
distribution.
Should Sikhs be permitted to do construction work without
wearing hard hats? If they are allowed to do this, will the state
incur additional health care expenses due to an increased number of
injuries? Should the state ensure that other safety precautions are
taken so that workers without hard hats will not be more vulnerable
to accidents? The adjudicative model appears to cut off from
consideration a wide variety of factors that ought to be taken into
account in deciding whether a hard hat requirement is justified. The
courts must either go well beyond the situation before them or make
a decision in an artificial context without considering all the factors
that are relevant to such a decision.

A "polycentric problcm" in the language of L. Fuller, 'The Forms and Limits
of
Adjudication" (1978) 92 Harv. L. Rev. 353 at 394.
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The failure of the courts to consider the background of state
resources and distributive policies will be less of a concern if the
courts limit the focus of their review to "fundamental" interests interests so important, that they ought to be satisfied in spite of the
effect this might have on other government programmes (reducing
the resources available to the state for other programmes). Of
course, if the courts do narrow the scope of review and focus on a
limited number of fundamental interests, the equality right will lose
much of its comparative quality and will begin to appear as a
straightforward guarantee of certain limited welfare rights.
In many circumstances, the toleration of disparate impact
need not be regarded as a limitation on the right to equality. The
right to equality requires that each individual be given both a fair
opportunity to develop as fully as he or she is able and an equal
share of the benefits and opportunities of the community.
Recognition of the right to equality does not require that other goals
or values be disregarded. A law which does not extend benefits to
all individuals may be quite consistent with the right. If some
individuals cannot benefit from certain goods, there is no reason why
those goods should be denied to the rest of the population. For
example, the blind are not permitted to drive cars, but there is no
reason why this activity should be denied to the seeing public.
Although a particular law might not benefit all individuals, that
disadvantage may be compensated for by the advantage of another
law; for example, the state could establish special transportation
facilities for the blind.
However, the issue of justification is complicated because the
pursuit of equality is constrained by the state action doctrine and the
adjudicative model. Since the focus of judicial review for violations
of the right to equality is on particular laws and not on the entire
system of distribution, the courts are not free to structure the system
as they see fit, ensuring that certain rights and goals in addition to
equality are protected. The courts must look at the law before them
and decide whether or not it should be struck down. If a law which
adds to a group's existing disadvantage is necessary to the
achievement of an important social end, it will be upheld, despite its
adverse effect and despite the failure of the state to improve, in
some other way, the lot of the disadvantaged group.
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Remedial discretion may allow some flexibility. An element
of accommodation may be required by the courts - for example,
upholding the hard hat requirement but creating an exception to it
for Sikhs. Occasionally, the courts may make affirmative orders;
instead of striking down a law which excludes a particular group
from its coverage, the court may order that the coverage of the law
be extended to include the group (for example, build ramps or
enforce a prohibition of gender discrimination in the amateur
sports). 48
The courts, though, are not in a position to alleviate the
situation of a disadvantaged group by ensuring that other benefits
are provided - adjusting other laws to ensure some compensation for
the disadvantageous effect of the law in question (for example,
providing special transportation facilities for the blind). Generally,
the courts are limited to two choices. They can strike down the law
in question, or they can uphold it. Because equality is pursued
interstitially - focusing on particular laws rather than on the system
of laws - the only way for the courts to provide for interests and
values other than equality is to uphold the law and permit some
disadvantageous effect. Justification on this basis is properly seen as
a limitation on the right to equality under section 1. Issues of
justification are external to the right to equality since the courts
must balance equality (the wrong of additional social and economic
disadvantage) against other values and interests represented by the
disadvantageous law. Section 1 has a role to play in section 15
adjudication because of the political and structural constraints placed
on the courts in their pursuit of equality of result.
VI. CONSTRUCTIVE DISCRIMINATION OR INTENTIONAL
DISCRIMINATION?
Confined by the adjudicative model and the state action
requirement, review for constructive discrimination strikes at only

48Affirmative orders will be made in situations where the state has distributed some
benefit but has excluded a certain group from the distribution. The court will decide to order
that the scope of a law be extended to an excluded group (rather than that the law be struck
down) when inclusion within the law's scope is something beneficial.
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discrete, positive action taken by the state. No obligation is placed
upon the state to take positive action to improve the lot of its
citizens. The right requires only that "action" by the state be fair
and balanced. A discrete wrong is remedied by the courts striking
down the offending law or action.
However, the prohibition of constructive discrimination
cannot be understood as simply a protection of the "liberty" of the
Review for constructive
individual from state interference.
discrimination is a comparative right which does not fit comfortably
within the boundaries of our traditional liberal conception of rights
and freedoms. It is concerned with equality of result, the position
of individuals in the community, and their access to social benefits
and opportunities. It is simply constrained in the pursuit of this end
by an adjudicative model which is designed for the protection of
liberal rights. The doctrine of state action, the limited view of
justification, and the focus on particular groups all give the right a
liberal quality, so that it appears to be a slight extension of the
prohibition of prejudice.
If we accept that equality involves more than freedom from
invidious state action, should we then discard the barriers associated
with the state action doctrine and the adjudicative model and
recognize a more thorough-going equality of result? 49 The
traditional model of constitutional adjudication creates a distorted
view of equality and denies its deepest implications. However, there
are reasons for holding fast to these limits on judicial review.
The adjudicative model and the state action doctrine reflect
the institutional and political position of the courts. The avoidance
by the courts of a thorough-going results-based right to equality is
understandable given the indeterminacy of the requirements of
equality. Equality of result is the product of the entire legal order
and not of any particular law. The achievement of equality of result,
although a flexible goal, involves a careful structuring of the legal
order - so that adjustments can be made to compensate for
disadvantages in some contexts and to allow for the recognition of
goals other than equality. Were the courts to enforce a thorough-

49A. Chayes, 'The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281; 0. Fiss, "Foreword: The Forms of Justice" (1979) 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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going equality of result, they would have to intervene wholesale into
the legislative process leaving little scope for choice by the
legislature. The courts' role would be complex and open-ended.
Even review for constructive discrimination may test the
courts' institutional competence and threaten the legitimacy of
judicial review. Review for constructive discrimination requires the
courts to judge the appropriateness of laws which have a
disproportionate impact on a disadvantaged group or which fail to
satisfy the fundamental interests of a segment of the population.
Judgments of this sort may be controversial and may have farreaching consequences.
Perhaps, then, the courts should reject a results-oriented
approach entirely (including review for constructive discrimination)
and limit the right to equality in the Charter to a prohibition on
prejudice-based decision making. The prejudice-based version of the
equality right is attractive because it seems to draw a clear line
between right and wrong, between actions which are consistent with
the equality right and actions which violate the right. It is wrong
when legislative or administrative decisions are made for reasons of
prejudice. Regardless of its consequences, a legislative decision that
is not improperly motivated will not be questioned by the courts. As
long as the legislature is not intentionally treating some individuals
as inherently less worthy or deserving than others, its decisions
concerning the regulation of social life will be respected. Judicial
intervention will be infrequent - with the courts most often finding
a violation of the right in the actions of administrators rather than
legislators. Recourse to section 1 will not be necessary, since a
decision based on prejudice is a decision based on morally improper
criteria and can never be reasonable and demonstrably justified.
However, as suggested above, the clear line appearance of
prejudice-based discrimination is illusory. Prejudice is irrational,
unthinking; by its very nature it is inarticulate and inexplicit.
Discrimination rarely involves an act which is specifically intended to
harm the interests of a particular group because that group is
considered to be inherently inferior. The use of certain stereotypes
may not involve an intention to harm or disadvantage, nor an
intention to treat as less worthy and deserving than the remainder
of the population; nevertheless, their use may involve an incorrect
and damaging assumption about the group members.
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The courts appear to avoid difficulties and maintain the
integrity of the category of prejudice-based decision making by
relying on objective indicators of intention. In determining whether
prejudice has been a factor in a particular legislative act, the courts
examine the relationship of the means chosen (the legislative
category) to the legitimate ends claimed for the law.
This
assessment of means to ends requires that a court make a judgment
about the value of certain ends and the utility of certain means. By
looking at objective circumstances to discern intention and by
automatically labelling certain things as prejudice (if the
differentiation appears to be unreasonable, prejudice will be
assumed), the courts perform a limited version of results-based
review while maintaining the language of prejudice and subjective
intention. This language preserves the claim that the decision is the
vindication of a distinct and uncontroversial wrong, rather than a
judgment about the fairness of the distribution of social benefits and
burdens.
Beyond this, however, the prejudice-based view seems too
narrow a conception of the right to equality. The principle of
human equality which underlies the prohibition of prejudice-based
decision making will support a deeper egalitarianism; a concern for
the satisfaction of human needs and interests. It is difficult to
contain the right to equality. The prohibition of prejudice is easily
and inevitably transformed into an obligation to work equally for the
benefit of all individuals, a form of equality of result.
The interpretation of section 15 as a prohibition of
constructive discrimination places the right somewhere between a
narrow protection against prejudice-based decision making by the
state and an intrusive thorough-going assertion of equality of result.
The prohibition is concerned with equality of result but limits the
scope of its protection to the interests of certain historically
disadvantaged groups. Because this interpretation is a middle ground
(a compromise), it will be subject to a variety of pressures. In
reviewing legislation for constructive discrimination, the courts may
feel that they are doing too little, that considerable inequality
remains untouched by their limited review, or they may feel that
they are becoming too deeply involved in legislative decision making,
that the role expected of them is not one they should perform. In
any event, the courts will find it difficult to define the limits of their
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review, particularly because of the synthetic character of concepts
such as state action. The lines fixing the scope of the right to
equality will be uncertain and unstable. The courts, though, may
have no choice but to embrace this unstable compromise and to
muddle through.
VII. CONCLUSION
The problems involved in interpreting section 15 illustrate a
tension which runs through the Charter. The Charterperforms two
functions. It expresses the fundamental rights of our political
community, and so plays an important symbolic role. The Charter
also performs a practical function. It provides for the protection of
the rights it proclaims. The Charter is a constitutional document
which places responsibility on the courts to ensure that its rights are
not violated by any act of the state. The courts are empowered to
strike down laws which violate the rights set out in the Charter.
There are times when the functions of symbolic declaration
and practical protection of rights are in tension. The general
omission of "positive" or "socio-economic" rights from the Charter is
an example of the "practical" function of the Charter taking
precedence over the "symbolic" function. We may accept that each
person has a right to the satisfaction of basic needs such as shelter,
food, medical care, and education, but we may doubt that the courts
are an appropriate institution to protect this right. Judicial review
in aid of welfare rights is difficult because of the systemic
considerations involved in the protection and advancement of these
rights.
This may provide some explanation for the "liberal" bias of
the Charter. Given the institutional character of the courts,
supported by the traditional model of adjudication and the state
action doctrine, the Charter is best used to protect "liberal" rights,
guarding against invasions of individual liberty by the state. The
courts are better able to judge the appropriateness or fairness of
state interference with the freedom of citizens, than to assess the
extent of the positive obligations the political community owes to its
members. The legislature is left with the difficult task of structuring
the social system in the fairest way.
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A broad right to equality (a thorough-going equality of
result) would involve an unlimited and unmanageable intrusion by
the courts into the social order. But, if the right is interpreted in
a restricted way as prohibiting and protecting the interests of certain
groups in certain limited ways, what has become of the Charter's
symbolic role? Equality of result surfaces in review for constructive
discrimination but its assertion is limited. The right appears to be
concerned only with invasions of individual liberty or autonomy discrete acts of wrong against individuals - and not with an
important positive obligation the political community owes to its
members.
There is a risk that this narrow interpretation of the right to
equality may reinforce the limited view of equality that is held by
certain groups in the community and may inhibit the emergence of
a community which is more completely egalitarian. It is important
that we recognize that the courts, through the interpretation and
protection of the rights set out in the Charter, can play only a part
in the elaboration of the fundamental obligations that the community
owes to its various members. We can neither expect the courts to
ensure that each and every human right is satisfied, nor forget that
the primary responsibility for ensuring that society is just and fair to
all its citizens falls upon our elected representatives.

